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1. At approximately 0645, 25 October 1944, Task Unit 77.4.3. made almost simultaneous contacts, through an ASP plane and SO radar, with an enemy surface force, about twenty-five miles to the northwest. This Japanese force consisted of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, estimated speed 26-30 knots , course 120° (T). Our own Task Unit was then in approximately Latitude 11-46 N. Longitude 126-09 E. 2. The six CVE's of the Task Unit were in a circular disposition within a circular screen consisting of 3 DD's and 4 DE's. Wind about 10 knots from E. N.E. Plying conditions average with numerous squalls and heavy rain showers in close proximity. Aircraft on board: 10 FM-2, and 11 TBM-1C. (8 VF had been launched at 0500 as an objective CAP). 3. Immediately the contact was identified as enemy, the OTC changed the disposition's course toward the east to a heading which was sufficiently close to the wind to permit launching and which at the same time did not tend to further close the range. Maximum speed was made, slightly in excess of 19 knots, and by 0710 all immediately available aircraft 10 VF and 8VT had been launched. 4. Ranges closed rapidly. WHITE PLAINS and FANSHAW BAY were first taken under fire and large caliber shells were falling well within the formation with several salvos straddling those two ships. At this time all ships were ordered to make smoke and the screening vessels left the disposition to launch a torpedo attack. Fire was opened with the ship's one 5"/38 caliber gun and observers in the ship reported that three hits were scored on the closing heavy cruisers 5. By 0750, the disposition had been maneuvered in successive steps to a southwesterly course which left KALININ BAY and GAMBlER BAY on the exposed windward flank of the formation where smoke afforded little or no protection. (Our smoke drifted to starboard and aft) .meanwhile, a part of the enemy force had turned our flank and was closing the range from northeast. Three enemy CA's were thus in a position to close at will, since no screen remained to intervene. They maintained a heavy and disastrous fire with 8" guns while, at the same time, salvos from the enemy's main body astern fell dangerously close to the ship's side and may have caused some underwater damage not immediately apparent. Notwithstanding this concentrated fire, the ship, by maneuvering on each side of the base course, successfully avoided salvo after salvo until first hit at 0810. Thereafter, the ship was hit almost continuously in the flight deck page
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