1.          This report must be weighed in the light of the vagaries of the human memory under stress. As is always the case, witnesses to the same event differ radically in reporting their observations. The entire action filled a crowded two and one-half hours, which in retrospect seems like but a bad dream of a few minutes duration. The action was followed by a two day period spent in the water awaiting rescue and another day in the rescue craft looking for additional survivors before any attempt was made to record the events covered by this report. All logs, records and notes taken during the action were lost with the ship. Nevertheless, the principle events are believed to be set forth in proper chronological order and the intervals between successive events are probably not seriously in error. The exact time indicated for each occurrence, however, may be in error by as much as ten minutes.

2.          Statements made concerning allocations of missions and responsibilities are made without benefit of reference to the applicable operation orders (lost with the ship and replacement copies not obtainable at present) . It is hoped that significant omissions, if any, will be clarified by forwarding seniors.

3.          Until the time that the ship was hit in the forward engine room with consequent loss of speed and resultant separation (about 0825) from the Task Unit, the ship conformed to the maneuvering signals of G.T.U. 77.4.3 whose report no doubt embraces this phase of the action.

4.          All times stated herein are ITEM (--9 Zone) and east longitude date

1.          At approximately 0645, 25 October 1944, Task Unit 77.4.3. made almost simultaneous contacts, through an ASP plane and SO radar, with an enemy surface force, about twenty-five miles to the northwest. This Japanese force consisted of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, estimated speed 26-30 knots , course 120° (T). Our own Task Unit was then in approximately Latitude 11-46 N. Longitude 126-09 E.

2.          The six CVE's of the Task Unit were in a circular disposition within a circular screen consisting of 3 DD's and 4 DE's. Wind about 10 knots from E. N.E. Plying conditions average with numerous squalls and heavy rain showers in close proximity. Aircraft on board: 10 FM-2, and 11 TBM-1C. (8 VF had been launched at 0500 as an objective CAP).

3.          Immediately the contact was identified as enemy, the OTC changed the disposition's course toward the east to a heading which was sufficiently close to the wind to permit launching and which at the same time did not tend to further close the range. Maximum speed was made, slightly in excess of 19 knots, and by 0710 all immediately available aircraft 10 VF and 8VT had been launched.

4.          Ranges closed rapidly. WHITE PLAINS and FANSHAW BAY were first taken under fire and large caliber shells were falling well within the formation with several salvos straddling those two ships. At this time all ships were ordered to make smoke and the screening vessels left the disposition to launch a torpedo attack. Fire was opened with the ship's one 5"/38 caliber gun and observers in the ship reported that three hits were scored on the closing heavy cruisers

5.          By 0750, the disposition had been maneuvered in successive steps to a southwesterly course which left KALININ BAY and GAMBlER BAY on the exposed windward flank of the formation where smoke afforded little or no protection. (Our smoke drifted to starboard and aft) .meanwhile, a part of the enemy force had turned our flank and was closing the range from northeast. Three enemy CA's were thus in a position to close at will, since no screen remained to intervene. They maintained a heavy and disastrous fire with 8" guns while, at the same time, salvos from the enemy's main body astern fell dangerously close to the ship's side and may have caused some underwater damage not immediately apparent. Notwithstanding this concentrated fire, the ship, by maneuvering on each side of the base course, successfully avoided salvo after salvo until first hit at 0810. Thereafter, the ship was hit almost continuously in the flight deck and in spaces above the waterline. Few of these hangar and flight deck hits reached any vital parts of the ship. They did kill and wound a number of officers and men. Fires caused by the hits, prior to loss of all power, were brought under control.

6.          At about 0820 the forward engine room received a hit below the waterline and with all available pumps in use, flooding could not be controlled. The water rose above the level of the burners and it became necessary to secure and abandon the forward engine room at 0827. The ship slowed to 11 knots and dropped astern of the disposition.

7.          Ten minutes later, steering control forward was lost, as a result of a hit near the island structure which probably severed liquid lines to the steering telemotor and a subsequent hit which opened circuit breakers on the main distribution panel prevented the re-establishment of steering control at either Battle II or the trick wheel prior to the time that all power in the ship was lost. Within three minutes of this event, a shell entered No.3 boiler in the after engine room and all steam pressure was lost. At 0845, the ship was dead in the water, there was no power and water was rising rapidly in all spaces below the second deck which resulted in a decided list to port. By 0850, three enemy cruisers had closed and were firing into the ship at point blank ranges. At this time, many fires were burning within the ship, which was now listing badly to port, and it was ordered abandoned by the Captain. Approximately 750 men left the ship, taking with them many seriously wounded of whom a number were subsequently rescued. At 0907 the ship capsized to port and sank at 0911 in Latitude 11-31 N. , Longitude 126-12 E. As the ship capsized, an enemy cruiser was still firing into her at a range of less than 2,000 yards.

8.          Forty-five hours later, the majority of the survivors were rescued from the sea by a number of LCI's and PC's dispatched from Leyte Gulf.

 
PRELIMINARIES

1. This ship sortied from Secadler Harbor, Manus, Admiralty Islands, on 12 October 1944 in compliance with orders from C. T. U. 77.4.34 (Com CarDiv-26, Rear Admiral R. A. Ofstio in KITKUN BAY) and enroute to Leyte Gulf , it provided air cover for Groups of Task Force 78. Upon arrival in the vicinity of Leyte Gulf and at approximately sunset of 19 October 1944, it was detached and under the orders of an in company with C.T.U. 77.4.34 proceeded to its operating are where designation was changed to T.U. 77.4.32 and rendezvous was effected on 20 October 1944 with T.U. 77.4.31 to form T.U. 77.4.3. During the next succeeding five days, the ship, while in company with the Task Unit, steamed in its day operating and night retirement areas to the east of Samar.

The ship's aircraft during this period provided direct support for operations ashore and anti-submarine and combat air patrols.

2.          This task Unit's primary mission was to provide direct air support for the landing operations of the First Cavalry Division and the 24th Infantry Division on northern Leyte. In addition, the Task Unit was made responsible for: Providing Combat Air Patrol for the northern transport and objective areas. Providing a part of the Anti-Submarine Patrol for the transport area. Providing own Combat Air and Anti-Submarine Patrols for the local defense of own ships against submarine and air attack.

3.          Responsibility for the interception of any major surface attacks upon any units of the Seventh Fleet engaged in the support of the landings was understood to be assigned to the Third Fleet. However, this Task Unit had been enjoined "to be ready to load torpedoes on short notice" and to be prepared to attack enemy surface forces if directed.

4.          Prescribed bomb allowance for each CVE for this operation included only a limited number of 500# SAP bombs, as well as the normal allowance of nine (9) aircraft torpedoes. No A.P. bombs were included in the allowance. (Note: A.P. bombs carried originally were placed ashore to make room for the increased number of G.P. ' s prescribed as bomb allowance for this operation). Thus, by inference, operations by this Task Unit against enemy surface craft were expected to be of limited scope and to be confined to those executed pursuant to specific timely directives, in each case, from authority higher than the Task Unit or Task Group Commander. No search responsibilities had been assigned this Task Unit.

5.          The presence of enemy surface units to the south (Surigao Strait) was known by reason of intercepted dispatches but no knowledge existed in the ship of any enemy force having sortied through San Bernardino Strait. First knowledge of such a force came at 0645 when this Task Unit made direct contact.

6.          At 0500, 25 October 1944, the scheduled objective combat air patrol of 8 VF was launched by catapult. The Task Unit was then approxi mately 70 miles northeast of Suluan Island on a launching course of 040° (T). This course was maintained until launchings of the other carriers had been completed and at about 0550, the course of the Task Unit was changed to 350° (T).

7.          When contact with this northern enemy surface force was established T.U.77.4.3 consisted of 6 CVE's (FANSHAW BAY,Rear Admiral C.A.F. Sprague, O.T.C. , ST. LO, WHITE PLAINS, KALININ BAY, KITKUN BAY AND GAMBlER BAY) with a screen of 3 DD's and 4 DE's consisting of: HOEL (F) (DD-533) , JOHNSTON (DD-557) , HEERMAN (DD-552) , SAMUEL J . ROBERT S (DE-413) , DENNIS (DD-405) , BUTLER (DD-339), RAYMOND (DD-341) Initially the screen was equally spaced around the six carriers which were in formation 5-R. The FANSHAW BAY was guide in station 2.5300. The GAMBlER BAY occupied station 2.5120,which placed her 5,000 yards bearing 120° (T) from the Guide. Insofar as the carriers were concerned, the circular disposition was maintained throughout the action and this vessel held its approximate station until it was forced to drop astern by reason of the loss of one engine.

8.          The Task Unit was deployed in this disposition at the time that the enemy forces were encountered. The latter's composition can only be estimated but it is generally believed by those that had an opportunity to observe it that it consisted of three or four battleships, six or eight heavy and/or light cruisers and probably at least four destroyers. In addition to this force, a brief visual contact was made with a force of three destroyers to the south who responded correctly to a flashing light challenge but who did not join or take any part of the subsequent action.

ENEMY SHIP IDENTIFICATION

1.          The following is a list of ships which came near enough (between 0800 and 0900) from the northeast and east sectors to possibly be identified by type and class: 1 Tone CA, 1 single stack DD, 1 Atago CA, 1 Aoba (or Mogami) CA, 1 two stack DD, and 1 Kongo BB.

2.          The column of ships, 6-1/2 miles to the NE (0745---0800) fired on by the 5. gun, was led, on a southerly course, by a Tone CA. The identity of the other two ships was doubtful at the time. (Note: The battery officer reported only 3 ships in column yet the SO radar operator reported and the FPI indicated 4 ships in column).

3.          The Recognition Officer, whose battle station was on the open bridge, sketched the ships at 0835 as in a loose column, (south to north) but not all in the same formation, in the order given in paragraph ( I) above.

4.          Two VC-l 0 pilots, who abandoned ship from the port side of the forecastle, are positive that a Kongo BB crossed the bow, close aboard , from port to starboard (0855--0905) .As he abandoned ship the Navigator identified a Mogami class CA on an opposite parallel course firing from approximately 2,000 yards on our starboard beam. (Note: it is quite possible that more than one (I) enemy heavy ship crossed our bow and the last would have been a Kongo, BB reported previously as the last in the column of enemy ships.)

5.          During the remainder of the day, survivors reported having seen 1-2 DD's tending a BB evidently dead in the water. Also, other groups reported a CA with 1-2 DD's standing by. In the first case, the pagoda superstructure was the identifying feature, but to some observers, the width of the beam did not seem great enough to be that of a BB. In the second case, the size of the ship with the absence of the pagoda superstructure identified it as a CA and not a BB.

6.          Toward dark, the BB was seen to swing around and hold a northerly course with at least l-DD nearby. The speed could not be estimated but the fact that it held the same course was evidence of being underway.

7.          About 0300 definite underwater explosions were felt and shortly afterwards a large cloud of smoke was visible to at least two groups of rafts -- This may have been indication of the scuttling of either the CA or BB .

8.         On the morning of the 26th and thereafter no enemy ships were sighted by the survivors.

Continue to Leyte Gulf - Part II